It’s time for another episode of /k/ Planes! This time, we’re looking at the South African Border War.
Belligerents: South African Air Force
>>27745248 By the early 1960s, South Africa’s air force was in terrible shape. The quality and number of aircraft had declined since the SAAF’s involvement in Korea, and the onset of arms embargoes due to the illegal occupation of SWA meant that the SAAF was hard pressed to update their forces. Efforts to procure new aircraft were often hamstrung by new rounds of sanctions, meaning that the SAAF would be forced to procure small numbers of several types of aircraft to fulfill their needs. Once the embargoes completely cut off access to parts for their aircraft, the SAAF looked inwards, making use of their domestic arms industry to not just keep their aircraft flying, but upgrade them as well. Weapons, avionics, and countermeasures packages were all developed for the SAAF to employ over the course of the 23-year long conflict.
Belligerents: South African Air Force
>>27745256 Even so, the SAAF was hardly in a good position. South Africa was completely unable to replace losses, meaning that every aircraft was invaluable. Over the years, the SAAF adapted tactics to counter the increasing foreign support for the MPLA. Low-altitude flight profiles became the norm, and pre-fragmented bombs with toss-bombing profiles would replace the more aggressive rocket-pod attacks by the end of the war. Long-range oblique photography would replace the riskier medium-level overflights, and short-ranged guided missiles would give way to longer-ranged glide bombs. By the end of the war, the danger to crews would only grow as Angolan air defenses solidified and the newest Soviet-supplied MiG-23s outclassed the SAAF’s Mirage F1s. Ultimately, the SAAF’s luck would catch up with them. The last major battle of the conflict - Cuito Cuanavale - would for the first time see the Angolans holding air superiority.
Belligerents: UNITA
>>27745264 The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola was one of the three primary rebel groups in Angola during the border war. Though South Africa started the conflict fighting against them in support of the Portuguese, they would come to be South Africa’s closest ally in the region by the time the war had ended. Being an anti-government guerrilla group, UNITA lacked an air force, but they would down more Angolan aircraft than the SAAF ever did thanks to the massive amounts of supplies coming from the US and captured from the enemy. Being opposed to the communist-supported MPLA, they would work with South Africa to secure the portions of the Angola-SWA border from SWAPO terrorists, and their forces would often make up the bulk of South African task forces. Unfortunately, UNITA’s losses are usually omitted from battle statistics. While SADF casualties were always low, UNITA footsoldiers usually suffered just as much as their foes. By the end of the war, they were increasingly dependent on South Africa - particularly the SAAF - to halt attempts to crush them.
Belligerents: South West Africa People’s Organization
>>27745272 In response to the illegal occupation of South West Africa and the onset of South Africa’s oppressive apartheid policies in the territory, SWAPO formed in hopes of bringing their country freedom. When peaceful means failed, the left-leaning organization resorted to terrorism, basing themselves out of SWA’s unstable neighbors. SWAPO would see active support from South Africa’s neighbors, and, although South Africa regularly performed cross-border raids to weed out SWAPO, they never succeeded in ending foreign support for SWAPO. As with UNITA, SWAPO resorted to asymmetrical warfare and terrorism, meaning that their anti-air capabilities were more often than not limited to RPGs, Strelas, and Iglas. They did down their share of SAAF helicopters and light aircraft, but they were not doing well by the end of the war. SWAPO only barely survived to the end of the Border War, which would end not due to the organization’s power or any recent attacks, but rather international pressure against South Africa.
Belligerents: MPLA
>>27745279 The communist-aligned People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola started out as one of the three primary resistance groups in Portuguese Angola and rose to take control of the country by the time independence was gained. Their support for SWAPO meant they were increasingly clashing with South Africa, and their communist alignment meant they received quite a lot of foreign aid from Soviet-aligned nations. Soviet-supplied aircraft would allow the MPLA to create an air force in 1976, and advisors from Cuba, Russia, East Germany, and Romania would help them get their air forces off the ground. Similarly, the foreign support led to the creation of an air defense network that by the 80’s covered almost the entire border with SWA. They did have their shortcomings - training was lacking, limiting night operations and making navigation difficult and accident rates high - but by the end of the war the MPLA possessed the largest and most advanced air force in Sub-Saharan Africa. The newest MiGs and missiles outpaced even the SAAF, and it showed. At the end of the conflict, the MPLA was for the first time able to secure air superiority over their own territory.
Belligerents: Cuba
>>27745286 The Cubans had been involved in Angola since the 1950s, providing support for MPLA rebels in their struggle against Portugal. Involvement was fairly minor up until Operation Savannah, at which point the Cubans began to commit ground and air forces to defend the MPLA. Although the MPLA had created an air force as early as 1976, for much of the war the skies were defended by Cuban pilots and aircraft, as they were better trained and maintained than the Angolan fighters. Although the MPLA’s presence in the air improved over the course of the war, Cuban MiGs would be a persistent presence over the battlefield, particularly at Cuito Cuanavale. Over 50,000 Cubans were in Angola by the end of the war, and they were often fighting alongside the MPLA against UNITA and the SADF. Where other communist powers were in Angola purely in support roles, the Cubans were actively fighting on the front.
The Aircraft: North American Harvard
>>27745294 Known as the T-6 Texan in American service, the Harvard Trainer would be among the first fixed-wing aircraft to participate in the Border War. Although not originally intended for combat operations, the poor state of the SAAF in the early days of the war and the good rough-field performance of the trainer meant that it would have to make do. Their normal armament of two .30 caliber machineguns was supplemented by underwing hardpoints for rocket - either 3 inch rockets or 37mm pods. The Harvard would be most active in the opening years of the war, flying in support of Portuguese counterinsurgency operations until the SAAF got more capable aircraft available for deployment to the theater. By the time of the Carnation Revolution in 1974, the Harvard had stopped flying in combat roles.
The Aircraft: English Electric Canberra B(I)
>>27745300 By the time the Border War broke out, the SAAF had 9 Canberras flying with 12 Squadron, and Rhodesia had a further 20 in their inventory. Though already verging on obsolescence, the total air supremacy the SAAF enjoyed during the first part of the war ensured that the Canberra could serve actively until the last years of the conflict. They made their first deployments towards the end of Portuguese involvement in Angola for strategic reconnaissance and mapping the border region, but over time they began to expand to bombing missions as well. On occasion, they flew strikes alongside their Rhodesian counterparts to strike rebel camps in the nations surrounding their respective countries. However, as the war drew on and the Angolan air defense network expanded, missions over the border eventually became prohibitively dangerous. Bombing sorties were curtailed to only the most lightly defended targets, and even the odd reconnaissance flight became increasingly scarce in the last months of the war.
The Aircraft: Blackburn Buccaneer
>>27745305 South Africa had acquired its fleet of 16 Buccaneers in 1965, equipping them with 24 Squadron. Although the SAAF had hoped to procure more examples, the onset of sanctions cut the orders short at just 16 airframes. Fortunately for the SAAF, the 16 planes of 24 Squadron would be the most capable strike platform of the war. They had the range and performance to strike heavily defended targets deep inside Angola, and its crew of two allowed it to deploy guided munitions like glide bombs and TV-guided missiles. Spectacular low altitude performance meant that the Buccaneer fleet was often committed for precision strikes on some of the most strategically important targets of the conflict. Even though 24 Squadron flew against some of the most heavily defended targets of the war, they performed excellently - by the time the fleet was retired in 1991, their only loss had been in an accident - incidentally on their very first deployment of the conflict.
The Aircraft: Dassault Mirage III
>>27745311 The Mirage IIIs of Cheetah Squadron would see surprisingly sporadic use during the Border War. Having converted from Sabres back in 1963, Cheetah Squadron’s Mirage IIIs had proven to be poorly suited to the conditions along the border. High landing speeds limited the airfields the aircraft could operate from, and, coupled with its short combat radius, it was unable to hit targets deep in Angola. Although the fighter-equipped CZ, DZ, and EZs were largely replaced along the Cutline once the Mirage F1 came along, the reconnaissance-equipped RZ and R2Zs would remain in the theater for much of the war. Because the photo-recon Mirage IIIs were the only aircraft other than the Canberras equipped for reconnaissance, their deployments to the Cutline would be increasingly common as the war continued.
The Aircraft: Dassault Mirage III
Quoted By:
>>27745316 >goddammit forgot the pic The Aircraft: Dassault Mirage F1 AZ/CZ
>>27745316 In 1971, the SAAF had made plans to purchase 100 Mirage F1 fighters to replace the Mirage III. However, the onset of new sanctions meant that the order was threatened, and, although the rushed procurement allowed for some aircraft to be delivered, final numbers amounted to just 16 F1CZ and 32 F1AZ. With deliveries beginning in 1975, the Mirage F1s wouldn’t make their first deployment to the border region until 1978. During the last decade of the war, they would prove invaluable. They finally provided the SAAF with a fighter capable of striking deep into Angola, and, although it would eventually be eclipsed by the arrival of the Angolan MiG-23s, the Mirage F1 would claim the only aerial victories of the war. Although the fighter role was more glorious, where the Mirage F1s really came to shine was as an attacker. Deploying unguided bombs almost exclusively, crews perfected the tactic of toss-bombing, allowing them to safely provide close air support even in the presence of enemy SAMs. Four Mirage F1s would be hit by SAMs over the course of the conflict, but only one would actually be downed by enemy fighters during the 23-year war.
The Aircraft: Aermacchi Impala
>>27745334 The unsung hero of the Border War was undoubtedly the Aermacchi Impala. The SAAF had come to acquire a fairly large contingent of two-seater Impala Mk.1s and single-seat Mk.2s by the time the Border War had broke out. Though far from competitive with modern strike fighters, it was easy to fly and maintain, meaning that it would be the only fixed-wing aircraft permanently deployed to the border over the entire course of the war. Armed with rockets, bombs, and internal cannons, Impalas regularly flew armed reconnaissance sorties with great effect. Whereas the faster aircraft were generally only employed for larger operations, the Impala ensured the SAAF could maintain a constant presence over the Cutline. When treaties and SAMs began to restrict the Impala’s cross-border sorties, they took on more benign roles, such as Telestar (airborne communication relaying). Although the Impala was eclipsed later in the war, it stuck around until the conflict’s conclusion, flying some of the last combat sorties of the war.
The Aircraft: Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-21MF “Fishbed”
>>27745340 The nimble MiG-21 would be among the first fighters to see combat use over Angola. Arriving with the Cubans in 1976, they provided a much-needed supplement to the MPLA’s nascent air force. By 1981, MiG-21s began to reach MPLA units, serving with them for the entire war. Although the MiG-21 was an ever present threat, it was rarely seen. Its short range and the emphasis on ground-controlled intercept meant that they were often scrambled late, rushing in on SAAF bombers more to scare them off early rather than down them. Given the more passive use of the MiGs, their performance was fairly underwhelming even operating over friendly territory. The only engagements the MiG-21s took part in always ended in SAAF victories, and they failed to down any SAAF aircraft during the war. Looking at the fairly extensive losses among the MPLA/Cuban MiG-21 forces to SAMs, it seems that they were also used in strike missions as well. However, poor training, small payloads, and short ranges limited the Fishbed’s effectiveness in the role.
The Aircraft: Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-21MF “Fishbed”
Quoted By:
>>27745344 >shitting dick nipples The Aircraft: Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-23ML “Flogger”
>>27745344 With the arrival of the MiG-23ML in 1984, Angola finally had a fighter at its disposal that outclassed anything the South Africans could field. The MiG-23ML boasted an excellent thrust-to-weight ratio and long-range radar-guided missiles, giving it an edge over the Mirage F1s that formed the backbone of the SAAF fighter corps. For perhaps the only time in the aircraft’s history, the MiG-23 was actually the most capable fighter in the conflict. Although normally configured for air-to-air duties, the Angolan Floggers would more commonly see use as strike aircraft. To the South Africans, they often made their presence known just as the MiG-21s had - as fast-moving blips on early warning radars. As with the MiG-21, engagements between the MiG-23 and SAAF F1s were few and far between. However, the Flogger was markedly superior to the older MiGs. Its incredible acceleration allowed it to stay well clear of SAAF missile engagement envelopes, while its superior avionics and long-range missiles allowed the Floggers to score a hit on a South African Mirage without any losses of their own in air combat. For all their prowess in the air, however, they suffered heavy losses. Early operations were marred by training accidents (a product of the Flogger’s horrific pilot workload), and losses to ground fire (particularly UNITA SAMs) more than made up for their excellent performance in air-to-air combat.
Background
>>27745354 In the years following the Second World War, the world slowly moved towards decolonization. Most European countries came to relinquish their colonies (willingly or otherwise), and those holding back were being met with increasing pressure from the international community. South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia would be the main targets of such pressure in Africa. South Africa had occupied German South West Africa (SWA) since WW1 by mandate of the League of Nations, but this had been reversed by the UN, who declared that the nation should be independent. South Africa resisted such pressure and treated the nation as a fifth province, ultimately giving rise to a resistance movement - SWAPO. In the neighboring Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, the situation was similar. Portugal had been fighting three separate guerilla groups in Angola since the 50’s (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA), culminating in a full-scale civil war starting in 1961, and Rhodesia, unwilling to end the white minority rule, declared independence from Britain in 1965, sparking yet another bush war.
Background
>>27745363 Although air operations would span most of Southern Africa in the coming 23 years, the bulk of the fighting would take place in a region of SWA known as Ovamboland. Ovamboland was the region of the SWA-Angola border just south of the Cutline - a crude four-foot fence devoid of vegetation on either side spanning 420 km from Ruacana Falls to the Cubango River. Being close to the equator, the climate was quite extreme. Ovamboland and the area to the north was almost perfectly flat and featureless, devoid of even rocks. Once the massive flooding from the yearly April rains dried up, the area was akin to a massive sandy beach without an ocean. Elsewhere, it was little better - low brush provided visual cover for men on the ground, but such vegetation could hardly be called a forest.
1965 - 1974: Police Actions
>>27745371 In July 1965, a group of terrorists crossed into SWA near Rundu to establish a base of operations for their coming attacks. Over the course of the second half of the year, the six men had orchestrated two attacks, killing at least five people. As attacks continued into the next year, the South African Police moved two SAAF Alouette IIIs up to Windhoek to help track down the terrorists. Over the coming months, a total of seven helicopters were moved to the region, all while the SAP tracked down the location of the terrorist camp. By now, the camp had moved closer to Ruacana. In late August 1966, the seven helicopters relocated to Ruacana airfield in preparation for the first helicopter assault in SAAF history - Operation Blouwildebees. The nighttime assault would be a resounding success. Two terrorists were killed and another eight captured, although an unknown number escaped into the wilderness. Though the helicopters were returned back to South Africa after the operation, it did not mark a de-escalation. When the next attack came in December 1966, the SADF was now offering assistance in the form of logistics and aircraft (both fixed and rotary wing).
1965 - 1974: Police Actions
>>27745380 At the end of July 1967, the SAAF made the choice to bring in fixed-wing air support to deal with an expanding counterinsurgency. Eight Harvard trainers, equipped for combat, were to be stripped of any identifying markings and transferred to Rundu airbase near the Cutline. Each was given 400 rounds for their machineguns, two were configured for carrying 3-inch rockets, and the remaining aircraft were fitted with SNEB 37mm rocket pods. Flying out of South Africa, they had to make several stops along the way to refuel, but they would make it to the border without incident. Upon arrival, the crews learned of their mission - they were to support a helicopter assault (by SAP, of course) on a village 80 miles north of the Cutline in Angola where terrorist leaders were to be meeting. Unfortunately, the raid went poorly. The slow-moving formation dropped their men at the wrong village at first, and by the time they found their target the enemy had been alerted and abandoned their positions.
1965 - 1974: Police Actions
>>27745391 Though this raid was a failure, it seems the police actions were succeeding - major incidents seemed to be declining, and the SAP were getting better at hunting down terrorists infiltrating from Botswana and Angola. However, for the Portuguese, things were getting worse. At the request of Portugal, the SAAF agreed to covertly provide assistance. Flying alongside the Portuguese Air Force, the SAAF committed helicopters and light aircraft as part of Operation Mexer in the Cuito Cuanavale region - well north of the Cutline. Through 1971 and ‘72, the SAAF secretly fought alongside Portugal in an effort to eradicate the UNITA and FNLA insurgents.
1965 - 1974: Police Actions
>>27745394 As the South African presence in Angola escalated in 1972, the joint South African and Portuguese forces found a lack of adequate maps, so the SAAF was enlisted to address the issue. The Canberras of 12 Squadrons were called into action, beginning an intensive photo-recon program that would span two years. Flying out of Portuguese bases in Angola, they mapped the whole country, and, with the cooperation of the Rhodesians, they covered all of Mozambique as well. Unfortunately, things only seemed to worsen for Portugal. Even the aid of the South Africans was not enough to stem the tide, and, as the years went on, things only got worse. The MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA were rising in strength due to foreign (primarily Soviet) support, and although MPLA support had been cut off in 1974 after a split with the Soviets, the Carnation Revolution took place in Portugal in late April, putting an end to the colonial wars overnight.
Operation Savannah
>>27745408 Although Portugal had relinquished control of her colonies almost overnight, Angola would not have a peaceful transition to majority rule. Rather, a three-way war broke out between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. Soon enough, the CIA got involved, hoping to raise enough support to defeat the communist-aligned MPLA. Recognizing that neither of these groups had any chance of overcoming the MPLA without foreign support, the US convinced South Africa to get involved. Less than a year after the Portuguese had left Angola, South Africa rushed into the country, ironically fighting alongside the very UNITA rebels they had been trying to kill. All the while, joint operations were beginning with Rhodesia, who now found that they had to contend with terrorists free to operate out of a now-free Mozambique.
Operation Savannah
>>27745422 The intervention that would be known as Operation Savannah started out small. At first, South Africa merely provided arms and advisors (much like America was doing). Though 24 Squadron had deployed four Buccaneers to Grootfontein in May 1975, they remained but a passive show of force. In August, a small SADF contingent advanced 50km into Angola to capture the hydroelectric complex that controlled the power and water supply for much of Ovamboland. Major raids against SWAPO bases soon followed, and agreements were made with UNITA and the FNLA to fight against the MPLA and SWAPO. All the while, however, the anti-MPLA forces were losing ground. Advisors seemed to be helping little, and passive support from light aircraft only accomplished the loss of a Puma and Cessna-185 to ground fire.
Operation Savannah
>>27745430 Everything changed on October 14, when Operation Savannah officially (albeit secretly) began. A motorized column codenamed Zulu crossed the Cutline at its eastern end, taking advantage of the chaos between the factions to rapidly advance across the country. Zulu sped across southern Angola almost unopposed. Rocadas fell on the 20th, followed by Lubango on the 24th, and before the month was out Zulu had reached the coast. To support Zulu, the SADF had formed three more task forces comprised of UNITA footsoldiers and SADF heavy weapons (Foxbat, Orange and X-Ray). Forming the the east and central parts of the country, they drove west to the ocean as Zulu raced up the coast. Orange made its way north from the UNITA HQ at Kuito, while Foxbat met up with Zulu at Lobito before breaking off to drive north parallel to Zulu and Orange. By early November, the SADF was racing towards Luanda almost unopposed.
Operation Savannah
>>27745436 Savannah’s incredible pace would not last forever. The first engagements with Cuban forces came on November 2, and soon enough Cuban forces were arriving in bulk. On November 9, the first 100 men of a special-forces battalion landed in Luanda, and the very next day, the combined MPLA/Cuban forces drove back the enemy assault with overwhelming firepower. Although the SAAF offered support with sporadic Canberra sorties, neither the SAAF’s bombers nor the SADF’s obsolete artillery could hope to compete with the BM-21s and long-range artillery. Where the SAAF really shined was with the transports. C-130s and C-160s were flying almost nonstop, bringing in supplies and evacuating casualties for the rapidly advancing spearheads.
Operation Savannah
>>27745447 By November 13, the Cubans had halted Zulu on the south bank of the Queve River. Despite concerted efforts to break out and take Luanda, the SADF would advance no further. Their obsolete equipment could not hope to compete with the overwhelming artillery superiority of the enemy, and they were now well beyond the range of the SAAF’s bombers. Cuban support was increasing with every day, and with the end of the year the SADF was faced with rotating out its soldiers on the front for fresh conscripts. The death blow to Savannah came in December, when Operation Savannah and the CIA involvement was revealed to the world by the New York Times. CIA support ended almost immediately (later to be made illegal by the Clark Amendment), and South Africa’s already strained relations with the rest of the world worsened. With all hope of capturing Luanda fading, the SADF made the decision to withdraw. The record of the campaign was impressive. Zulu had advanced 3,159km in 33 days, fighting 21 engagements and claiming 210 MPLA dead and 96 enemy wounded for just 5 dead and 41 wounded on their end. Due to the fact that South Africa was not officially in Angola, the 49 casualties across the four task forces were listed as MIA.
The Long Haul
>>27745456 With Savannah put to an end, South Africa was faced with an unsightly prospect. Direct intervention in Angola was now a political impossibility, meaning that the SWAPO terrorists were fairly free to set up bases just north of the Cutline. The new alliance with UNITA would come in handy in regions where UNITA controlled the border, but for much of the border the MPLA had regained control. In response to escalating SWAPO incursions, the SAAF saw increasingly common deployments to SWA. Initially, these deployments were just a continuation of the extensive photo-recon efforts that ended in 1974. In May 1976, Mirage IIIs from Cheetah Squadron were deployed to Ondangwa to fly three tactical reconnaissance sorties. Due to the threat of MPLA MiG-21s, Mirage IIICZs flew escort for the R2Z. Fortunately, these sorties went without incident, and Cheetah Squadron returned home. Two months later, they would make similar missions over Mozambique.
The Long Haul
>>27745476 Gradually, deployments of aircraft to SWA were expanding beyond brief reconnaissance missions. 24 Squadron's Buccaneers made a brief deployment some time in 1977, but it wasn’t until 1978 when the first permanent deployment - six Impalas to Ondangwa - was made. This deployment came as part of a greater shift in doctrine. Recognizing that South Africa lacked the resources to sit idly by and counter SWAPO incursions within SWA, the SADF would now be tasked with more active COIN operations. This meant yet another escalation. To fight SWAPO, cross-border raids would become the norm. The first of these - Operation Bruilof - was planned for May 1978, aimed at a base just across the Cutline. However, in the late stages of planning, a larger base was discovered at Cassinga - 250km inside Angola. The target of the operation was changed, as was the name - it was now Reindeer.
The Long Haul
>>27745487 Reindeer called for a massive paratrooper assault supported by a preliminary attack by Buccaneers and Mirage IIIs. As the date of the operation approached, Mirage IIIs began relocating to the theater (the other aircraft had already been deployed), only to run into an unexpected problem - lack of transports. The entire C-130 and C-160 fleet had been earmarked for the operation, so the SAAF was only able to spare a single DC-3 to ferry maintenance crew. Thus, 12 men would have to keep the four Mirage IIIs flying for Reindeer. Early on the morning of May 10, the first aircraft set out. Four Canberras arrived over Cassinga first, dropping their Alpha bombs (special antipersonnel weapons), followed by a flight of four Buccaneers carrying 1000lb bombs. Two Mirages met the 250 paratroopers as they dropped over Cassinga and patrolled until fuel ran short, but were unable to provide direct fire support because of the hectic situation on the ground.
The Long Haul
>>27745501 As the assault on Cassinga came to an end, a large helicopter force set out to evacuate the men. During the evacuation, an MPLA armored column was discovered to be advancing on the town, so a request for any available aircraft was sent out. Two Mirages were the first to arrive, making several strafing runs until fuel ran out, at which point a single Buccaneer took over. The Buccaneer strafed until ammunition ran out, at which point it continued to buzz the enemy forces at low level. Ultimately, the evacuation was a success. SADF casualties were 3 dead and 11 wounded, while SWAPO lost over 1,000 men. However, the real significance of the Cassinga operation was its escalation - what had primarily been a helicopter-supported war had for the first time seen the introduction of high-performance jets.
The Long Haul
>>27745505 Reindeer would not be the only major incident of 1978, either. After a SWAPO attack in the Caprivi strip, another retaliatory raid was planned. After reconnaissance by a Mirage IIIR2Z supported by an F1AZ (the first SAAF Mirage F1 sortie), Buccaneers and Canberras hit a SWAPO base in Zambia over the course of two days. The air raids themselves weren’t too productive (only 16 enemy casualties), but the helicopter assault that followed would put an end to SWAPO incursions in the Caprivi Strip for the remainder of the war. In November, five Mirage F1CZs were deployed to Ondangwa to escort the Mirage IIIR2Zs. They operated without incident, although on one occasion they were nearly intercepted by two unidentified Angolan aircraft. By now, Impala operations had also become regular. Armed reconnaissance sorties around the Cutline had become the norm, with the Impalas flying at treetop level in search of SWAPO insurgents. In the event a target was found, they would make use of their underwing rocket pods and 30mm cannons to dispatch the threat.
Cooperation With Rhodesia
>>27745520 By 1979, the crisis in Rhodesia was reaching its peak. In February of that year, Air Rhodesia Flight 827 was shot down by ZIPRA rebels, killing 58 people. Rhodesia wanted to respond with an air strike, but with only four Canberras available, they requested support from the SAAF. The SAAF sent three bombers from 12 Squadron to Rhodesia at the end of the month to begin preparations. The Rhodesians had located a massive ZIPRA training camp near Luso in Angola - over 600 nmi from the airbase near Victoria Falls. The camp held an estimated 3,000 rebels, as well as an unknown number of Cuban and East German advisors. Plans called for the SAAF Canberras and three of the Rhodesian bombers to be loaded with 300 antipersonnel Alpha bombs, while the final Canberra would carry 1,000lb bombs.
Cooperation With Rhodesia
>>27745532 At dawn on February 26, 1979, the combined South African and Rhodesian forces took off towards their target. Escorted by two Sidewinder-armed Hawker Hunters and supported by a DC-3 monitoring enemy radios, they made their way at high altitudes over Zambia before descending at low level for their bombing run. After the successful attack, the formation split up. The Rhodesians returned to the main airfield at Salisbury, but the SAAF bombers landed at an auxiliary airfield to avoid unwanted attention. The operation would be the most successful Canberra strike of the war, and it was hailed by the Rhodesian media. The three SAAF Canberras would participate in several more joint operations with the Rhodesians, this time striking targets in Zambia in August of 1979. The attacks were also a success, although one SAAF Canberra was damaged by shrapnel from one of the bombs on the low-level attacks.
Cooperation With Rhodesia
>>27745550 In September, Rhodesia launched a series of operations aimed at strategic targets in Mozambique. 24 Squadron’s Buccaneers and Canberras flew support, doing extensive damage to the enemy
targets.At the end of the year, one final combined Buccaneer/Canberra strike occurred. However, things were hardly going well. The first operation (Ulric) marked the first operational failure of the Rhodesians in the entire war, and by the end of the year, Rhodesia had given in to majority rule. Two successive waves of voting occurred - one as the unrecognized state of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and then another “legitimate” round in early 1980 after Zimbabwe had gained official independence. Unfortunately, ZANU aggressively intimidated rivals, leading to Robert Mugabe winning the elections. Almost overnight, South Africa lost their last ally in the region.
Rekstok and Saffraan
>>27745563 When SWAPO responded to a peace initiative with renewed attacks, the SADF launched two new operations - Rekstok, aimed just across the Cutline, and Saffraan, aiming to hit SWAPO bases in Zambia. In early March 1979, the SADF crossed into Angola to destroy SWAPO bases, supported by Canberras and Mirage IIIR2Zs. As a precaution against Angolan fighters, Mirage F1s were deployed as well to fly CAP, escort, and armed reconnaissance. Low-level Canberra raids dropping Alpha bombs generally went well, but on March 14th, one Canberra was downed by ground fire after stray rounds incapacitated the pilot. F1s were scrambled to search for survivors, but none were found. Over the course of Rekstok, 25 sorties had been flown by the Canberras, dropping 7,300 Alpha bombs.
Rekstok and Saffraan
>>27745588 Saffraan would have heavier air support. 12 Impalas were flown out to Mpacha in early March, and Canberras and Buccaneers flying from more distant bases were also earmarked for the operation. Unfortunately, on their first raid, the faster bombers missed their target, leaving the only air support to the Impalas. Although the Impalas hit their mark, the raid was called off for fears that the target had not been suppressed enough. Fortunately, later raids went better. A concerted bombing campaign lasted for about 5 weeks, supported by recce teams on the ground reporting damage assessments. Infiltrations with larger teams to assault the bases would find the bases long since abandoned. However, the operation was a resounding success. The target bases were all destroyed, and Zambia responded to the attacks by withdrawing its support for SWAPO, denying them their country as a base of operations.
Rekstok and Saffraan
>>27745595 By the middle of 1979, one of the targets of Rekstok was discovered to be active again. A new strike, codenamed Rekstok II, was launched with two Buccaneers and seven F1AZs, wreaking havoc on the SWAPO compound. Meanwhile, another F1AZ hit a radio station just across the Cutline, while four Impalas hit a logistics depot at the same site. By the end of the year, the small Ondangwa airbase had morphed from a rough airstrip surrounded by tents and temporary structures to a major operations base. An intensive care unit had been established for casualties, and the Special Forces had established a headquarters at the base. A Fireforce reaction unit was permanently stationed at the base, as were maintenance personnel from the SAAF and a mobile radar unit to look across the border. Being just 30km from the border, security was tight, so much so that helicopter gunships covered any passenger aircraft coming in or out of the base.
A New Decade
>>27745601 As 1980 came, SWAPO had begun to change their tactics. Active attacks across the border were now too risky, so an aggressive minelaying campaign began to keep casualties lower. Meanwhile, cross-border airstrikes and regular Impala patrols had forced SWAPO to remain idle during the day, moving only at night. Fortunately, Impala pilots were quick to adapt as well. Round-the-clock armed reconnaissance flights began with ever-increasing effectiveness as pilots refined their nighttime tactics. SWAPO trucks soon began driving with no headlights, but Impala crews would soon learn to pick out even the faint brake lights among the dark terrain. Eventually, SWAPO abandoned moonlight driving as well. From now on, SWAPO would only move trucks on nights when the moon was not visible. Impala crews still took their toll on these darker nights, but such raids were more stressful for aircrews.
A New Decade
>>27745623 The next major operations of the war - Sceptic, Smokeshell, and Klipklop - would come in the middle of 1980. For the SAAF, these operations followed the pattern set in the previous years. F1s would escort Mirage IIIR2Zs to perform pre-raid reconnaissance, and then F1s and Buccaneers would follow up in waves of attacks on the targets. However, these targets were becoming ever more dangerous. Thanks to communist support, SWAPO got their hands on SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-7s, which they used to great effect. AAA layouts of bases improved, and in some cases bombing runs following the initial wave had to be abandoned due to the threat of the now-alerted air defense networks. Things were also worsening for the Impala crews. Several Impalas were downed by SWAPO MANPADS during 1980, and several more received significant damage. 1980 would end with Operation Wishbone - an unusual medium-level bombing raid of F1s led by a Canberra. The operation was a failure - not only was the drop inaccurate, but the target camps were vacant by the time the bombers arrived.
A New Decade
>>27745674 As 1980 turned into 1981, the war showed no signs of stopping. 1980 had been the deadliest year thus far for both SWAPO and the SADF, and SWAPO operations only seemed to be intensifying. Finally, by mid 1981, the SADF decided to launch a major operation to root SWAPO out of the border region. Operation Protea would involve two mechanized task forces to destroy the SWAPO strongholds at Xangongo and Ongiva and then seek and destroy logistical and training infrastructure. The SAAF had their own objectives. They aimed to neutralize MPLA air defenses along the border to give them freedom of movement for the foreseeable future as well as provide general support for the SADF task forces. For this, the SAAF assembled their largest force thus far in the war - 12 F1AZs, 8 F1CZs, 13 Mirage IIICZ/D2Zs, 18 Impalas, 5 Buccaneers, 6 Canberras, 3 Mirage IIIR2Zs,38 helicopters, and 29 transports and auxiliary aircraft.
A New Decade
>>27745682 Three days before the planned start date of Protea, SAAF fighters began to converge on their airbases. Shorter ranged aircraft like the Impalas and Mirage IIIs were stationed at Ondangwa, but the base could not handle all the aircraft, so those that could afford to do so - the Buccaneers and F1s - were deployed to Grootfontein. On August 23, 1981, 24 Squadron opened the offensive, flying deep into Angola to attack radar stations at Chibemba and Cahama. Lead aircraft fired AS-30 guided missiles, while the other Buccaneers performed high-altitude dive-bombing runs that kept them out of the SA-7’s engagement envelope. Just minutes behind them, formations of F1s led by a Canberra struck the targets with a combination of contact- and delay-fused bombs. Two more waves followed after that, this time hitting another radar installation that was yet untouched. Strikes against the two towns continued for the rest of the day, and as day turned to night, the SADF began advancing on the ground. Impalas were soon sortied to support ground forces
A New Decade
>>27745690 With the MPLA air defense network neutralized, the SAAF now shifted its focus to supporting the SADF. August 24’s air operations were kicked off by Impalas, which struck air defenses near the target towns. Buccaneers then swooped in, hitting high value targets with AS-30s, followed by Canberras and F1s as medium altitudes dropping iron bombs. Overall, Protea was going spectacularly. Ground forces were advancing, and the SAAF was meeting all objectives without loss. With the threat of MPLA fighters gone, the Mirage IIIs were switched over to act as fast-reaction CAS aircraft. As ground forces advanced, they captured a small airfield, allowing DC-3s to provide more timely resupplies. By the end of the month, the SADF had reached its objectives and had begun withdrawal. Protea had been a complete success. SWAPO and MPLA casualties approached 1,000 men, while the SADF had suffered just 10 dead and 64 wounded. over 3000 tons of equipment was captured, and the SAAF interdiction efforts had been so successful that intercepted radio messages were constantly complaining about serious supply shortages. Most importantly, the SADF had achieved a diplomatic coup by capturing a Soviet advisor, providing proof to the world that the Soviets were actively supporting SWAPO despite their denials. In the largest SAAF operation since WW2, 1,112 sorties were flown, dropping 333 tons of bombs, 1,774 rockets, and 18 AS-30 missiles. One helicopter was lost, and a Mirage III was damaged by an SA-7.
Operation Daisy - A MiG Kill
>>27745697 Protea’s long-term impacts would be felt for the remainder of the war. UNITA was introduced to the recently captured border region, pushing SWAPO bases well beyond the Cutline. Brief, violent incursions were now a thing of the past. In November, the SADF would launch Operation Daisy, aimed at further disrupting SWAPO plans. CAS was entrusted to 15 Impalas, but Mirage IIIs would be brought in for reconnaissance, along with 20 F1s for air superiority and 3 Buccaneers in case the SAAF needed to suppress enemy airfields. The operation started off uneventfully, but two days in the Angolan air force became surprisingly aggressive. Mirage F1s were kept on interception standby, and early in the morning of November 6, two fighters were sortied to intercept contacts. They flew out at low level to avoid detection by enemy radars, only climbing as they got close to the contacts. Flying at 20,000 ft, they identified the aircraft as two MiG-21s several miles to the port flying the opposite direction.
Operation Daisy - A MiG Kill
>>27745709 The F1s jettisoned their tanks and turned hard to get behind the unsuspecting MiGs. They closed for intercept, but the targets were flying into the sun, precluding the use of the Matra 550 IR AAMs. Instead, they closed to gun range. The lead F1 fired a burst of 30mm at the #2 MiG at about 350 m, hitting it. Both MiGs broke into evasive maneuvers, which the F1s followed. The lead F1 attempted to launch a missile, but it malfunctioned, so he closed back in for a gun kill. The MiG made the mistake of reversing his turn, allowing the lead Mirage to set his sights on it once more and down it. Meanwhile, the wingman was chasing down the lead MiG. In a high-speed descending turn, the wingman’s missiles twice malfunctioned, allowing the MiG to get away.
Operation Daisy - A MiG Kill
>>27745725 The MiG kill on the second day of Daisy would mark the first aerial victory of the war and the first SAAF kill since Korea. Daisy continued on for over a week, and the F1s were scrambled on several more occasions. However, the MiGs were being far more cautious, and they seemed to be flying purely in defense of their bases. 13 days into Daisy, the Mirages were withdrawn. On November 17, Daisy finally came to an end. the SAAF had flown 272 sorties from Ondangwa in support of it, while light aircraft operating from an airfield north of the border flew another 207. Daisy marked another major success along the lines of Protea. Another major SWAPO logistical base had been destroyed, and SWAPO was pushed even further into Angola. For South Africa, Daisy marked the deepest penetration into Angola since Operation Savannah.
‘82
>>27745739 Even after the devastation wrought in Protea and Daisy, SWAPO attacks continued. After Operation Super revealed that SWAPO was building camps to open a new front in Kaokoland, to the west of the Cutline, the SADF authorized a reconnaissance operation to update maps of the border region. Mirage IIIs and Canberras were earmarked for what would become Operation Rekstok III, with 1 Squadron’s F1AZs deployed to provide fighter cover. The operation went smoothly - the only notable incident occurred when one escort flight was vectored off to strafe a helicopter carrying enemy senior military staff. Rekstok III would end when the April rains came, leaving the SAAF time to prepare for a bombing campaign once the weather improved. Starting in May, this new campaign focused efforts around Cassinga. Given Cassinga’s reputation for active AAA crews, F1s and Buccaneers would handle the attack. F1s came in low, pitching up at the last moment to perform dive-bombing attacks, while the Buccaneers tried (unsuccessfully) to execute the first toss-bombing attack of the war. On the receiving end, there were also some firsts - the ZSU-23-4 Shilka was firing back at the attackers.
‘82
>>27745773 By July, the MPLA and SWAPO were preparing to retake the towns lost in Operation Protea a year prior, so the SADF launched Operation Meebos to stop them. As Angolan air defenses had recovered since their last beating, the SAAF side of the operation would focus on neutralizing the network once more. On July 21, eight F1AZs escorted by two F1CZs struck the Angolan radars monitoring the region, knocking them out. Those on CAS standby were less active, however. Difficulties locating SWAPO headquarters meant they would have to wait until August for their first real sorties to be flown. When they were finally called into action on the first day of August, however, it would be hectic. 12 F1s were sortied to support ground forces near Techamutete with Mk 82 bombs, followed by two F1AZs fitted with 68mm rocket pods. The rocket-equipped F1s followed the bombers, loitering until the skies opened up with RPGs and Strelas, providing the F1s with targets to strike. Once again, the SADF was successful, capturing or destroying vast amounts of enemy stores. However, it came at a high cost - 29 men were killed. Politically, it was also unsightly - the SADF had advanced as far north as Cuvelai.
‘82
>>27745781 On October 5, 1982, two F1CZs were escorting a Canberra on a recon flight when ground-control alerted them to incoming contacts. The fighters broke off to engage, meeting their targets at 30,000 feet and closing with them at twice the speed of sound. As they crossed paths, the enemy - MiG-21s - fired missiles, which flew past them harmlessly. The F1s immediately turned hard to get on the enemy’s 6, finding that the MiGs were making a gentler turn to preserve their supersonic speed and escape. However, the lead F1 flipped on his radar, and as he did, the MiGs made a sharp turn - either to intercept the Canberra or a reaction to the radar. The F1s accelerated to Mach 1.3, catching up with the MiGs. As they did, the flight lead fired one of his missiles, but, being at the edge of its engagement range, it burnt out harmlessly. Closing in, he fired a second missile, which exploded behind the target as it cut into a split-S. Though damaged, it would limp back to base. The F1s then turned their attention to the remaining MiG, which had performed a split-S the opposite direction. The F1s closed rapidly, and the leader opened up with his 30mm DEFA cannons at 230 m. The MiG exploded in a fireball, and the leader, with no time to evade, stalled out his engine as he flew through the fireball. Fortunately, the engine was restarted in flight, and the F1s returned home without incident. The SAAF had just claimed their second MiG kill of the war.
Slowing Down
>>27745795 As the new year came, it seemed as if the war was finally defusing. Major operations were few and far between, and those that did come harkened back to earlier days, when Canberras, Impalas, and light aircraft were the only SAAF support. Operation Maanskyn, involving eight Impalas on nighttime raids, proved so effective that just ten days of operations brought international pressure for new negotiations that would ultimately accomplish little other than forcing the SAAF to stop the raids. In their place, less conventional concepts were tried. A propaganda campaign making use of loudspeaker-equipped light aircraft and pamphlet-dropping DC-3s was conducted, and several DC-3s were converted to gunships a-la the American AC-47. Gunship DC-3s - Dragons - were equipped with 20mm cannons aimed out the left side of the aircraft as well as the “Skyshout” aerial loudspeaker system. For the first time in years, operations remained solely domestically oriented. However, Mirage F1s would be deployed to Ondangwa in April, complete with newly developed pre-fragmented bombs that would soon make rocket pods obsolete.
Slowing Down
>>27745840 Even the first “real” air operation of the year - Skerwe - would be done with Impalas. In retaliation for an ANC bombing in Pretoria, eight Impalas with rockets were sortied to strike ANC buildings in Maputo, Mozambique. By the middle of the year, ground operations had picked up - the SADF was performing sweeps into the shallow area of Angola again, regaining its offensive posture. However, SAAF operations continued to be limited to sporadic Maanskyn flights. In August, when the MPLA retook the town of Cangamba, A UNITA request for support in retaking the town was met with a new operation - Karton - which would be heavily dependent on the SAAF. With transports and helicopters providing logistical support, the centerpiece of the operation was to be an air attack on hardened MPLA positions. With how far north Cangamba was, only Canberras and Buccaneers would be able to reach the target. The SAAF committed four of each, loading them with a total of 24 1,000lb bombs, 36 500lb bombs, and eight AS-30 missiles.
Slowing Down
>>27745851 On August 13, the bombers were relocated to Grootfontein in preparation for the attack. Plans called for the bombers to attack out of the sun at 8:00 the next morning. The aircraft took off the next day without incident, flying under radio silence once the Cutline was crossed. Given the lack of air defenses over the target, the bombers could take a more leisurely attack profile. While the Buccaneers would kick off the attack with AS-30s aimed at the entrances to enemy bunkers, the next wave - the Canberras - came at a comfortable medium altitude, providing time for the bombs to achieve a steep penetration angle. With the Canberras’ payloads expended, the Buccaneers returned to drop their bombs, this time in a dive-bombing profile. The attack went almost perfectly. The AS-30s made their first impacts at exactly 8:00, and the attack devastated the combined Cuban/MPLA forces. Uniquely, the casualty figures of the battle seemed more like that of an SADF operation than a UNITA one. The enemy suffered 829 casualties and 300 captured, while UNITA lost only 63 men.
Slowing Down
>>27745866 Much of the rest of the year consisted of a series of ground operations punctuated by the occasional air strike intended to prepare for the SADF’s next major blow against SWAPO - Operation Askari. Infiltration teams were sent across the border to scout out targets, and COIN operations on both sides of the Cutline continued. Meanwhile, the “Dragon” gunship had proven so effective that the SAAF ordered a second conversion. However, fixed-wing air support was more often limited to Impala strikes. With the SAAF preparing for Askari, they were unwilling to spare their fast jets for such minor targets. COIN operations slowed as the weather worsened, and, although recce teams would infiltrate Angola at the end of November in preparation for Askari, the coming rains forced other operations to be put on hold.
Anonymous
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Great thread and topic. Many thanks!
Askari
>>27745872 In early December, Operation Askari kicked off. SADF forces initially focused their efforts on Cahama, which for some time had been the subject of air attacks due to its radars. Actual operations against the town began in mid November - recce teams were constantly attacking supply lines. Once Askari officially began, the SAAF joined in, striking important targets and identifying enemy positions for SADF artillery to bombard. As part of this attack on Cahama, a concerted effort was made to drive the SA-8 batteries positioned at the town far enough south for the SADF to capture them Things went well at first. The SA-8s were forced to relocate several times, with each new position getting progressively closer to the SADF. At Cahama, MPLA morale was plummeting, and it seemed as though the SADF would overrun the town. Unfortunately, Askari had attracted the attention of the rest of the world, and with international attention came outrage. International pressure mounted, and on the last day of December 1983, the assault on Cahama was called off.
Askari
>>27745973 Further north were the twin objectives of Quiteve and Mulondo. Plans for the assault on those towns were little different from the assault on Cahama. First in the line of fire was Quiteve, which would fall almost without firing a shot on December 11 in the face of artillery and airpower. The MPLA sent two tanks south to help stall the advance, but the SAAF responded with F1s, destroying one of the tanks and forcing a withdrawal. Unfortunately, the SADF advance would soon be checked by Soviet-supplied D30 artillery pieces, which outranged the SADF guns. Air support earmarked for the assault on Cuvelai had to be diverted to make up for this shortcoming. Even so, SADF forces moved slowly. The Angolans and their air defense network were now on high alert, making attacks increasingly dangerous. On December 23, an Impala was struck by a Strela on a CAS sortie. Fortunately, it managed to limp back to base under its own power. The ultimate plan of capturing Mulondo would never be completed - as with the assault on Cahama, the Mulondo objective had to be abandoned in early January due to mounting international pressure.
Askari
>>27745982 The final part of Askari - the assault on Cuvelai - began in late December. The operation began with an extensive photo-recon effort, followed by air attacks that began on December 27. Combined efforts of Impalas and Canberras targeted air defenses and the town’s airstrip, hoping to cut enemy morale and convince them to abandon the town. Unsurprisingly, the MPLA remained undeterred. Attempts to assault the town by ground forces were driven back by tanks, artillery fire, and 23mm AA guns. Both sides dug in and prepared for the next attack. On the afternoon of January 3, ten Impalas, followed by four Canberras performed a massive airstrike. Soon after the first wave left the skies over Cuvelai, eight more Impalas appeared overhead to drop more bombs. The attack would be tremendously successful. ELINT operators picked up the Angolans desperately requesting aid from HQ, reporting that 75% of their artillery had been destroyed.
Askari
>>27745997 On January 4, the ground assault began. SADF artillery opened up, and Ratel APCs began to cross the open minefields to break into the town. MPLA T-55s counterattacked, but they were driven off by artillery fire. By the end of the day, the SADF had entered Cuvelai to find it deserted. Fleeing MPLA forces found themselves caught between SADF elements in Cuvelai and Techamutete to the north. As SADF forces mopped up the surrounded enemy, international pressure reached its peak. With ground forces losing momentum due to poor weather and the threat of further sanctions looming, the SADF finally halted Askari on January 10. By February 1984, the front had stabilized, and South Africa now found itself in control of all the territory between the Cunene and Cubango rivers as far north as Tetchamutete. With Askari now officially over, the results could be tallied. the MPLA lost 429 men and SWAPO a further 56, while five Cubans were killed and another captured. The SADF lost 25 men and 65 wounded, all while capturing vast swathes of enemy territory and massive stores of enemy equipment. Unfortunately, Askari would only serve to attract more aid from the Soviets and Cubans. Things were not going to be ending anytime soon.
An Uneasy Peace
>>27746007 International pressure in reaction to Operation Askari forced South Africa to the negotiating table at the end of 1983. While SWAPO had been crippled, they remained a threat, and after some negotiations, relative peace was agreed upon. South Africa withdrew back south of the Cutline, but SWAPO activities were reduced. This by no means pointed to an end of malicious intent - as with every break in the war, SWAPO and the MPLA took full advantage of any lulls to bolster their position. In early 1984, SADF intelligence got their hands on a document that came to be known as the “Iko Carreira Plan.” The plan detailed the long-term communist strategy for neutralizing the SAAF through the establishment of an effective air defense network. Through extensive support for Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, the Soviets hoped to establish an early warning network that covered nearly all of South Africa’s borders. Stations along the Angolan border could peek over the Cutline at 20,000 feet, and most alarmingly, Mozambican radars could see well into South Africa proper. 1984 would be largely uneventful apart from extensive reconnaissance operations that hoped to find evidence that the MPLA was violating the terms of the peace agreements, but to no avail. They did find many alarming things - like the establishment of a Zambian fighter airfield near the Caprivi Strip - but legally there was nothing that could be done.
Proxy War
>>27746026 By mid 1985, it seemed as though the days of peace were over. Intelligence reports, corroborated by Canberra reconnaissance flights, pointed to a massive buildup of MPLA forces near Cuito Cuanavale and Menonque in preparation for an assault on the strategically important airfield at Mavinga. Fortunately for UNITA, their cause had gained favor in the international community. The US repealed the Clark Amendment in July 1985, opening the door to support for UNITA. Though hamstrung by the peace agreements, the SADF would also do their utmost to aid UNITA in the coming offensive. When the Cuban/MPLA forces finally launched their assault in July as part of Operation Congresso II, the SAAF launched their own support operation - Magneto. Unable to provide direct combat support, they instead ferried reinforcements between Gago Coutinho to Cazombo in the besieged enclave to north. Due to the threat of Angolan MiGs, all flights were to take place at night. Nevertheless, the SAAF racked up an impressive record - fixed-wing transports flew 220 hours between 23 August and 10 September.
Proxy War
>>27746044 Unfortunately, the SAAF’s ferrying of troops was incapable of fending off the Cuban-supported MPLA forces. Thus, on 11 September, an evacuation effort began - Operation Wallpaper. If Magneto seemed hectic, Wallpaper would be even more so. C-130s, C-160s, L-100s, and DC-4s were earmarked for the operation, flying 310 hours (again only at night) until the operation ended on October 8 to pull UNITA troops out of the Cazombo enclave. Soon after Wallpaper began, Jonas Savimbi (the leader of UNITA) was pleading for direct SADF intervention, as it was clear that they could not hold off the MPLA at Mavinga alone. Finally, on September 16, the much-needed intervention began. Operation Weldmesh, a series of airstrikes aimed at stopping the enemy advance.
Proxy War
>>27746053 During Weldmesh, the SAAF took advantage of the poor state of Angolan air defenses in the far corner of the country. The same critical gap in regional radar coverage that the SAAF had capitalized on for the transport operations earlier that month would again be critical for these airstrikes to succeed. The MPLA had only two airfields in the region - Cuito Cuanavale and Menonque - and only Menonque was capable of handling fighter operations. Although the MPLA had deployed MiG-23s to provide fighter cover, crew quality was poor. Radio discipline and navigational procedures were poor, and no night operations were flown. In the absence of an extensive ground-based air defense network as seen along the Cutline, the SAAF could operate relatively freely.
Proxy War
>>27746068 A key element of Weldmesh would be anti-helicopter duties. Combined efforts of the SADF/UNITA ground forces were wreaking havoc on enemy supply lines, so helicopters became the primary means of support. With only 10 Soviet-supplied helicopters at their disposal, the MPLA logistics were incredibly vulnerable. Close cooperation with ground-based recon and Impalas allowed the aircraft to sneak in at treetop level when a helicopter took off, intercepting them over the battlefield and downing them before fleeing in the face of Angolan MiG-23s. On September 27, the first successful mission was flown, claiming two Mi-25s, and two days later, the remaining Hinds and two Mi-8/17s were downed as well. Helicopter operations soon stopped, and with it the MPLA offensive stalled. By the time Weldmesh ended, the SAAF had flown over 200 hours in the F1, 37 with Buccaneers, 69 with Canberras, and 241 with Impalas. Air operations over Eastern Angola for the remainder of the year were more benign - Buccaneers were configured for long-range oblique photography over the stabilized front, and Impalas largely flew telestar missions to keep radio contact with rapidly moving ground forces.
Proxy War
>>27746077 By the end of 1985, the MPLA/Cuban offensive had petered out and the war had stabilized once more. Conventional warfare had halted, but SAAF operations continued. Transports continued to fly in support of UNITA forces, and the occasional bombing run on enemy positions was conducted. Thanks to the newly-arrived Boeing 707 tankers of 60 Squadron, the SAAF bombers could expand their area of operations - a vital improvement given that most fast jets were limited to flying from Grootfontein. The nature of these new bombing runs was significantly different from older campaigns, however. The threat of Angolan MiGs and ground-based air defenses was increasing with every day, and extreme measures had to be taken to protect the aircraft. Strikes were almost exclusively flown by F1s, coming in a treetop level to perform toss-bombing strikes or the semi-toss Gatup attack profile. The SAAF would make history in May, when their F1s performed the first night toss-bombing raid in history.
Proxy War
>>27746088 After the disastrous defeat of the MPLA in 1985, they and their allies began to investigate the reasons for their losses. While the most apparent - a lack of suitable air defenses - was already being addressed, other measures were slower to take hold. A major revision of the logistics structure - the MPLA’s achilles’ heel in the last campaign - had to be undertaken, and troops began training to make use of passive air defense measures to reduce the impacts of air attacks. Cuban troop levels were boosted to 50,000 men, and more new Soviet equipment than ever was flooding into the country. The SAAF would also take the time to bolster their side. Rundu, the closest airbase to the front, got its share of improvements. A mobile radar was brought in to look over the border, and various extensions and improvements were made to the airfield to allow for the SAAF to deploy more fast jets along the Cutline.
Proxy War
>>27746094 To the west, things remained calm as well (save the endemic SWAPO incursions). In late June, two Buccaneers were sent out to perform an oblique-photography recce flight over Namibe to confirm the presence of Su-25s at the airbase there. Though the mission profile called for the aircraft to pop up to 21,700ft for their photo run (keeping them a comfortable 12 nmi from the base), unexpectedly low clouds forced them to complete the run at 2,000 ft instead - bringing them directly over the airfield. Regardless of how ill-advised the run was, it was successful. Local air defenses were caught by surprise, and the Buccaneers returned home unscathed, having proven the existence of the Angolan Frogfoots. The only other major air operation that year would be Operation Bernico in September. The aim of Bernico was to use Mirage IIIs (both fighter and recce variants) to bait Angolan radars for ELINT purposes. Other more regular reconnaissance missions were also flown as the year came to an end, including one over a now very unfriendly Zimbabwe.
1987
>>27746107 Although SWAPO activity had never really recovered from Askari, they remained enough of a threat to warrant renewed cross-border operations. However, such missions were now primarily ground- or helicopter-based, as the SAAF was more concerned with the increasingly aggressive Angolan MiGs. In May, a special forces team was sent to Lubango in hopes of sabotaging the enemy aircraft stationed there, and in April, the SAAF started serious attempts to lure the Angolans into an ambush. Tactics involved scrambling pairs of Mirages to loiter at low level whenever a MiG was detected. If the MiGs reached a certain point, the Mirages would be vectored to the enemy, popping up only at the last minute and activating their radars only just long enough to fire their missiles. Unfortunately, the efforts were in vain - not a single such sortie was successful.
1987
>>27746114 By June, the SAAF had revised their tactics. New radars were brought for ground control, as the older ones were unable to determine the target’s altitude, and those squadrons not deployed along the front had been spending their time training back home. By late June, the Angolans seemed to have caught on to the SAAF’s intentions. On June 28, a formation of 22 aircraft appeared on the radars, rather than the one or two formations that normally sortied. Intelligence soon determined after the fact that the Angolans set up the formation as a trap. Fortunately for the SAAF, an overly cautious ROE (no engaging unless a kill was ensured) meant that the large formation was never engaged. Overall, the skies over the Cutline were uneventful in 1987. Both sides had their sights set further east, and the Angolan air defense network would ensure that the SAAF would not get too bold over Western Angola.
Across the Lomba River - Operation Moduler
>>27746123 In the east, the situation was much different. After over a year and a half of waiting, the MPLA crossed the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale on June 22, 1987, pushing towards Mavinga. On paper, the offensive was almost identical to the one halted in 1985. However, that would be the only similarity to that failed operation. This time, the communists brought mobile air defense systems - SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14, and SA-16. Increasing numbers of helicopters, both Mi-8/17 transports and Hind attack helicopters, were deployed to Cuito Cuanavale, and MiG-21s, -23s, and Su-22s were deployed at Menongue. On the ground, the main push would be spearheaded by T-55s, BRDMs, and BTRs and supported by the same long-range artillery pieces that had been outgunning the SADF artillery since Operation Savannah over a decade prior.
Across the Lomba River - Operation Moduler
>>27746387 The SADF quickly caught wind of the enemy column advancing on Mavinga, and in early August they made their first attempt to halt it. Mirage IIIR2Vs scouted out the column, and in late August special forces were used to blow the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale, forcing the Angolans to rely on helicopters to ferry supplies across the river. Unwilling to risk invaluable manned aircraft to track the enemy, the SADF soon resorted to another first for the war - remotely piloted vehicles. On the ground, artillery duels had already began, and at night, Bosbok light aircraft were flown to spot for the guns. Unfortunately, the Angolans would prove to the SADF that they were no longer invulnerable at night - on September 3, a Bosbok was downed by an enemy SA-8.
Across the Lomba River - Operation Moduler
>>27746398 Because of substantial MiG activity over the advancing enemy forces, the SAAF deployed 3 Squadron’s F1CZs to Rundu on September 4. Continuing the same MiG-hunting tactics being used over the Cutline, they finally succeeded in intercepting two MiG-23s on September 10. Two F1s intercepted the Floggers head-on, banking hard to get on the 6 of the enemy, who were maneuvering more gently. The F1 wingman got in position to fire his missiles, but both times he fired the unreliable Matra 550s exploded harmlessly in the exhaust plume of the target MiG. The engagement would end up being indecisive - both groups withdrew after the last missile fell short.
Across the Lomba River - Operation Moduler
>>27746411 Meanwhile, 1 Squadron had ferried to Grootfontein. On September 16, they would fly the opening airstrikes of the South African reaction to the MPLA advance - Operation Moduler. Given the extreme threat of SAMs, the attacks were now exclusively toss-bombing sorties. Even with such a profile, the F1s were hitting their marks, and the newest generation of pre-fragmented bombs was proving invaluable. On September 27, the next MiG encounter came. Two F1s popped up in front of two Floggers just as before. They passed eachother head-on, and both formations banked left to engage. As they turned, the F1s were met with three missiles coming head-on. One narrowly missed the leader, but one of the others exploded near the tail of the wingman. Both sides disengaged, and the wounded F1 limped back to base. Unfortunately, on landing, the damaged F1 found it had lost hydraulics and its drag shoot. Unable to brake, the aircraft shot off the end of the runway at high speed. A heavy impact on the rough ground fired the ejection seat, which had insufficient time to deploy the parachute. When rescue crews found the pilot - Arthur Piercy - he was still strapped into his seat. Though he survived, he suffered a broken neck and would never walk again.
Across the Lomba River - Operation Moduler
>>27746420 This incident finally forced the SAAF to face the fact that the technical advantage lay firmly in the hands of the MPLA. 3 Squadron was hastily restricted to base defense and escort duties, and the MiG ambush efforts were ended. Meanwhile, 1 and 24 Squadrons were flying multiple strikes a day from Grootfontein to hold back the enemy. On October 11, a Buccaneer flew an oblique recon flight over the Cuito Cuanavale bridge alongside a combined Buccaneer/F1 strike. Unfortunately, the camera equipment had been jarred a couple degrees off-target, forcing the Buccaneer to fly the tremendously hazardous mission again three days later (fortunately without incident). Fortunately, the intense aerial and artillery bombardment paid off. On October 5, the MPLA forces began to withdraw on foot. As the dust settled, the battle was clearly an SADF victory. The MPLA had lost 61 tanks, 53 BTRs, 7 BMPs, 23 BRDMs, 20 BM-21s, and suffered over 3,000 casualties. Meanwhile, SADF losses amounted to five APCs, one Bosbok light aircraft, and a single RPV, along with 17 soldiers killed and 41 wounded.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
>>27746464 With the Angolans withdrawing, the SAAF was doing its utmost to turn an orderly retreat into a rout. Mirages and Buccaneers made use of the newest pre-fragmenting bombs to destroy enemy vehicles and wreck logistics, cutting enemy morale and forcing them to proceed on foot. Even as they did, missions were becoming all the more dangerous. Flights over Cuito Cuanavale were now accompanied by the constant drone of radar warning receivers, and only through skillful planning and even more skillful flying were crews able to make it home alive. On the ground, the MPLA had been pushed up along the east bank of the Cuito River, unable to cross due to UNITA guerillas to the west and SADF artillery to the east. With the MPLA in such a precarious position, against the advice of SAAF planners, the SADF launched an operation to destroy the MPLA forces - Operation Hooper
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
Quoted By:
>>27746485 >shit forgot pic On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
>>27746485 The SAAF’s reservations for launching the offensive would soon enough prove all too apparent. While the battle on the Lomba River took place equidistant to both the MPLA airfield at Menongue and the SAAF airfield at Rundu, Hooper aimed to attack where the enemy held the advantage. Rundu’s radars could not see over the battle area, while the MPLA had full view of the theater, and the differing distance to the battlefield gave SAAF F1s only 2 minutes’ loiter time and a 45 minute transit, while Angolan Floggers had just 11 minutes of transit and 45 minutes of loiter. Drop tanks could improve loiter time, but the F1s were having trouble enough competing with the MiG-23 completely clean. Everything had conspired to give the MPLA air superiority for the first time in the entire conflict. They had superior aircraft and equipment, an air defense network backing them up, and radars that could now see the entire battlefield, whereas the enemy were blind below 24,000ft.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
Quoted By:
>>27746506 Nominally, Hooper began with the conclusion of Moduler at the end of November. The SAAF hoped to neutralize enemy air superiority with a new weapon - the H2 glide bomb - to knock the airfield at Menongue out of action. On November 25, the Buccaneers escorted by four F1s made their way out to the target, flying at low-level to evade detection. The launch profile required a steep climb to the drop altitude, followed by a careful quick descent that maintained line-of-sight with the weapon for the navigator to keep control. Unfortunately, the attack was unsuccessful. That same day, the SADF launched an unsuccessful attack on the enemy forces, which had now dug in at Chambinga Heights. Minefields, Cuban reinforcements, and most critically of all, enemy fighters stalled the SADF advance.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
Hoping to stem the tide of reinforcements, subsequent glide bomb attacks targeted the bridge at Menongue. By mid-December, the bridge had finally been destroyed, but the supplies kept flowing. Special forces teams were then tasked with scouting out the enemy supply lines, and, despite the enemy air superiority, the SAAF would do what it could to cut the enemy logistical lines. Taking advantage of the Angolan reluctance to fly night operations, missions were flown exclusively by F1s and Buccaneers at either dawn or last light, and they were almost always toss-bombing missions. By the end of the month, however, Hooper had stalled. The SADF was forced to sit idle as the conscripts ended their service and the new wave of recruits was phased in, and the heavy summer rains prevented any significant operations.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
>>27746530 The battle resumed in mid January as the SAAF opened up with airstrikes against the Angolan positions. Though the SADF advanced, the positions were handed over to UNITA forces and soon lost to counterattacks. By early February, the battle had resumed in earnest. The SAAF employed more glide bombs to destroy the bridge across the Cuito River, and, sensing the threat to the airfield at Mavinga, an air defense network (ironically composed of both domestic SAMs and captured 23mm AAA and an SA-9) was established around the town. Though modest, the network did seem to work. The SA-9 battery managed to damage a MiG, and the Angolans almost immediately learned to avoid the town altogether. Meanwhile, 12 F1AZs of 1 Squadron were shifted up to Rundu in preparation for the next stage of Hooper.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
>>27746550 As the SAAF shifted its focus east, SWAPO took advantage of the chaos to launch a terrorist attack. On February 19, a bomb exploded at Oshakati, and the SAAF was tasked with retaliating against SWAPO training centers near Lubango. Two flights of F1AZs were tasked with executing two separate strikes the next morning. The first flight, making a toss-bombing attack, missed the target due to a navigational error. The second attack hit its mark, however, and all aircraft returned home safely. Back on the battlefield, the SADF was pushing forward as F1s continued to provide air support. On the afternoon of February 20, F1s were sortied to attack an enemy column on the Menongue-Cuito Cuanavale road. Although they executed the standard toss-bombing profile that normally kept them out of harm’s way, the Angolans had set up a trap, placing an SA-9 battery just under the pitch-up point for the attack. As an F1 flown by Major Ed Every broke off, a missile locked on, striking the aircraft as it reached low level. Though an intense SAR operation was launched, it soon became clear that Every had not survived.
On the Offensive - Operation Hooper
>>27746570 By now, the Angolans had free reign over the skies. MiGs kept the SAAF away, allowing Angolan aircraft to bomb the SADF forces with impunity. Everything the MPLA had suffered in the previous years was now inflicted upon the SADF. Vehicles had to remain dormant and hidden during the day for fear of enemy air attacks, and artillery could only be fired at night, lest they expose their position to the prowling enemy fighters. Two dogfights broke out on February 25, both involving formations of two F1AZs being intercepted by two MiG-23s. The F1s turned to engage both times and in the later case succeeded in getting into a firing position, but the MiGs made use of their better acceleration to escape. Though the F1s made it home alive each time, such engagements forced them to jettison their external stores and abandon their missions. By March, it was clear that Hooper had failed. The MPLA/Cuban bridgehead remained, and all momentum had been lost.
One Last Push - Operation Packer
>>27746584 On March 12, the SADF launched Operation Packer. Packer’s aim was identical to Hooper - drive the enemy off the east bank of the Cuito - but the time table was a bit ambitious - it called for this to be accomplished in just 8 days. Before the operation even began, there seemed to be little chance of success. Cuban MiGs hit SADF supply lines on March 9, and the SAAF could do little to respond. Air support for Packer wouldn’t come until March 19, when six F1AZs were ferried back to Grootfontein to launch a late-night diversionary attack on Longa. Though just a day before the operation was set to end, the hope was that the belated attack would divert enemy resources away from the planned axis of attack. Unfortunately, even nighttime could no longer protect the F1s. The formation attacked the target successfully, despite poor weather, but as they crossed the Cutline a SAM streaked up and plucked another MiG out of the sky. As with the previous loss, this crash would be fatal - Major Willie von Coppenhagen was killed as the aircraft crashed through the trees.
One Last Push - Operation Packer
>>27746605 The deadline for Packer came and went, with the SADF/UNITA forces still far from their objectives. Packer was extended into the next month, but poor weather would preclude any offensive operations for the next two days. Offensive sorties resumed on March 23, despite the still terrible weather. Coming in at 100 ft, three F1s made a toss-bombing attack at dawn, marking the last F1 sortie of the war. Two days later, the F1s were stood down and returned to South Africa. Although Packer nominally continued until the end of April, the battle had ground to a stalemate by the time the F1s flew their last sortie. With international pressure peaking, South Africa’s time in Angola was coming to an end. The Cubans and MPLA remained on the east bank of the Cuito, but there was nothing more that could be done.
One Last Push - Operation Packer
>>27746619 The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was a mixed bag for the SAAF. 794 sorties had been flown, dropping over 4,000 bombs and encountering at least 112 missiles from SA-2, -3, -6, -7, -8, -9, -11, -13, -14, and -16 systems, and enemy losses were estimated to be about 5,000. However, the SAAF was clearly outmatched. The Angolan Air Force had flown 1,200 sorties during the same time, and they managed to keep a continuous presence over the battlefield. Their particularly aggressive stance and comparatively poor training meant that they would suffer losses (8 MiG-23MLs lost between September 1987 and April 1988, including two to friendly fire), but they for the first time in the country’s history held air superiority over their enemy. The SAAF had lost only four of their own men and two fighters, but was wholly unable to support the offensive operations after Moduler. Air transport operations to Mavinga were limited to night sorties due to the threat of MiGs, meaning that supply lines were incredibly vulnerable.
An End to the War
>>27746628 As Packer ground to a stalemate, the SADF gradually began withdrawing its troops. Keeping a facade up on the front, they moved UNITA into their positions as the bulk of the forces withdrew. Meanwhile, negotiations that had been going on since the beginning of the year finally seemed to be making headway. As Packer came to an end, the Cubans launched an armored division towards Ruacana on the west end of the Cutline, and radars began to pick up enemy MiGs day and night. However, the thrust seemed to be a feint - they stopped 50km from the border without any SADF reaction. Packer gave way to a concerted withdrawal effort - Displace - at the end of April, lasting until the end of August. Meanwhile, the SAAF performed several operations of their own. A highly publicized fighter training excercise was performed in Ovamboland,, while more discreet photo-recon missions by Mirage IIIs were flown over the border. At the same time, supplies were flown into UNITA, who was now going to have to fight without direct SADF intervention.
An End to the War
>>27746639 In the end, the Border War would come to an end not through military but political means. In May 1988, US and Soviet leaders met in Moscow to declare that the Cubans would leave Angola and Soviet aid for the MPLA would end if South Africa left Namibia. By December 1988, the New York Accords were drawn up, and on December 22, 1988, Cuba, Angola, and South Africa agreed to the UN Resolution 435, which called for a South African withdrawal from Namibia and UN control over the country for a transition to independence. And that should have been that. The SADF spent the first half of the next year withdrawing, but on April 1 - the day the resolution took effect - SWAPO launched another offensive. Intense fighting occurred, during which SWA police were horribly outgunned and the SADF was forced to sit idly by until permission to engage was finally (and belatedly) given. As part of the SADF reaction, the final fixed-wing combat sorties of the war were flown by an Impala striking SWAPO positions. The fighting came to an end eventually, but at the cost of almost 400 lives. Ultimately, this was the last major incident of the border war. Minor disturbances along the border continued through the transition period, but in November 1989, Namibia finally held its first free elections in the country’s history. By the next year, Namibia was fully independent.
Epilogue
>>27746653 As with nearly every war in Africa, there would be no “happily ever after” the punctuate the end of the Border War. Namibia transitioned to independence better than many nations had, but the end of foreign involvement in Angola would not spell the end of the war. Political reform briefly showed promise at ending the war, but ultimately UNITA continued to fight on. Only in 2002 did the Angolan Civil War finally end with the death of Jonas Savimbi and dissolution of UNITA. Fortunately, the South Africa that had fought the Border War and been the source of such controversy for so long wouldn’t very long after the war. In 1994, Apartheid came to an end, and the country held free elections for the first time in its history. The end of Apartheid was a mixed blessing for the SAAF. Sanctions were lifted, meaning the beleaguered SAAF could finally update its obsolete inventory, but with no more war to fight and a much reduced threat from their neighbors, South Africa slashed budgets. Obsolete aircraft like the Canberra were withdrawn almost immediately, and the 15 surviving Buccaneers of 24 Squadron were retired in 1994. Five squadrons in total would be retired. Meanwhile, the Angolan Air Force has remained strong. Still forced to fight UNITA, they maintained a large inventory of aircraft to get the job done.
Anonymous
>>27746661 Fuck forgot the pic.
Anyways - here's a final note. Though this whole thing was written from the perspective of the South Africans, don't take it as a sign that they were the good guys. The South Africans very much brought the war upon themselves, and instead of trying to address the issues that created the insurgency, they merely threw the problem at the military and told them to sort it out. The truth is, there was no right side in the war. SWAPO undermined their own cause by primarily targeting the people they claimed to be liberating, and the MPLA devastated their own country by declaring single-party rule and trying to suppress the other rebel groups that had helped liberate the country. Even the foreign intervention was far from benign - rather than ending the war, the foreign powers involved seemed more content with just keeping the war going to prevent the pro/anti communist side (depending on who you look at) from gaining full control of the country.
Anonymous
Quoted By:
>>27746661 >>27746744 And that's all I got.
I figure I should start providing the main sources for these campaign threads, so here's what I mainly used for this one:
>From Fledgling to Eagle: The South African Air Force During the Border War by Brig-Gen Dick Lord Because the 4chan archives are all a shit, I've set up one at
kplanes.tumblr.com/archive - all but the oldest (and shittiest) threads should be there.
As always, I'm open to suggestions for new threads. I really don't know what the next thread will be just yet.
Anonymous
Anonymous
Quoted By:
Ace thread! Thanks a bunch!
